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Modeling  the U.S.  Dairy Sector with
Government Intervention
Donald J. Liu, Harry M. Kaiser, Timothy D.  Mount,
and Olan D. Forker
An econometric framework  for estimating a two-regime  dairy structural  system is
presented. Failure  to account for switching between  regimes due to government price
intervention raises the problem of selectivity bias.  Further, since  a structural  system of
equations is involved, the problem is not limited to the market associated  with the
intervention. Rather, bias from a single  source can distort all equations in the system.
The ramifications of not correcting for the bias in policy analyses are  investigated.
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The federal  dairy  price  support program  was
enacted in 1949 as a means of improving farm
prices  and incomes.  Under this program,  the
government attempts to support raw milk pric-
es by buying an unlimited quantity of manu-
factured  dairy products at the wholesale  level
whenever the market price falls below the an-
nounced  government  purchase  price.  The in-
tervention  of the  government  in this market
has broad-reaching effects not only on the farm
level but also on the wholesale and retail levels.
Our  objectives  are to:  (a) investigate the im-
plications  of this  type of intervention  on the
econometric specification of  a structural model
of the U.S. dairy industry and (b) examine the
empirical  ramifications  of not using  the  ap-
propriate specification in policy analyses.
When  considering  how  prices  in the dairy
sector are  determined,  the potential  for gov-
ernment  intervention  introduces  a  special
problem.  Prices  are  determined  by different
forces  depending  upon  whether  the  price  es-
tablished by competitive  supply and demand
conditions is above or below the government
price  floor.  If the  competitively  determined
market price for wholesale manufactured dairy
products  is  above  the  government  purchase
price,  a  "market  equilibrium"  regime  holds.
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In this case, the observed wholesale manufac-
tured price is the equilibrium price and hence
government intervention does not influence the
price formation process in the dairy sector. On
the  other  hand,  if the  competitively  deter-
mined market price is below the purchase price,
then a "government support" regime holds. In
this  case,  the  observed  wholesale  manufac-
tured price  equals  the government  price  and
the government buys the excess supply at that
level.  Hence,  government intervention  influ-
ences the type of price formation process that
operates in the market as well as the level of
prices.
Is the U.S. dairy sector really characterized
by a mixture of the two regimes? Due to recent
large  annual  government  purchases,  it  is
tempting to  describe  the  dairy  sector  exclu-
sively as a government  support regime. How-
ever, this observation is not appropriate when
examining  the  market  on  a  quarterly  or
monthly basis, particularly prior to the 1980s.
More  importantly,  using  government  pur-
chases  (rather than  the relationship  between
the government price and the market price) for
regime  identification  is  flawed  for the  dairy
sector. Some specialized manufacturing plants
package  products  according  to  government
standards and are not equipped to sell in com-
mercial  markets  even  when the  competitive
price exceeds the government price. Using the
price relationship as a criterion to identify re-
gime, the results in figure  1  show that the com-
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Relationship  between  the wholesale  manufactured and government purchase  price,
petitive  regime  held  for  42%  of the  period
1975-87.  Even during the  1980s when  dairy
surpluses were relatively large, the competitive
regime occurred in 22% of that sample. Hence,
with data from  1975 through  1987, it appears
that the two-regime system should be consid-
ered when specifying a model of the dairy sec-
tor.
To  date,  econometric  studies  of the  dairy
sector have not distinguished between the two
regimes  and  have  instead  assumed  that the
government  regime  always  occurs  (Kaiser,
Streeter, and Liu; LaFrance and de Gorter; Liu
and Forker). This is due to the fact that these
studies have not included a wholesale  manu-
factured dairy market  where  government  in-
tervention  occurs.  Failure  to  account  for
switching between regimes raises the problem
of selectivity bias, implying that conventional
least squares estimates may be biased and in-
consistent. Furthermore, since a structural sys-
tem of equations is involved,  these problems
are not limited to the market associated  with
the intervention. Bias from a single source can
distort all equations  in the  system.  The issue
here is to determine whether these distortions
are important for policy analysis.
In  the  following  sections,  an econometric
framework for estimating a two-regime  dairy
structural system is presented.  Correcting  for
selectivity bias implies modifying the first stage
of a conventional  two-stage  least squares  es-
timator and providing an alternative set of in-
struments for the second stage.  Since the con-
ventional two-stage least squares model is not
nested in the bias-corrected model, Atkinson's
test for nonnested models is used to determine
which one  is supported best by the data.  It is
shown  that  the bias-corrected  model  is  sup-
ported in all  equations, but the conventional
model is rejected in four out of five equations.
Finally, the ramifications of using the conven-
tional rather than the bias-corrected model in
policy  analyses  are  investigated  by  shocking
policy variables in both models. The resulting
impacts on key endogenous variables are found
to  be  significantly  different  between  the two
models.
A Conceptual Framework
The econometric  model of the dairy industry
consists  of farm, wholesale,  and retail  levels.
At  the farm level, raw  milk is produced  and
sold to wholesalers,  who in turn process and
sell  it to retailers.  Both  wholesale  and  retail
levels are  divided into  a manufactured  and a
fluid market. The  construction is similar to a
previous  model by  Kaiser,  Streeter,  and  Liu
in that  milk  products  are  divided  into  fluid
and manufactured  dairy products.  However,
the previous model only considered  the retail
and the farm levels. The extension  to include
Figure 1.
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*To  simplify,  this  figure  ignores  changes  in commercial  inventories,  specialized  plant  quantity,
and  farm  use.
Figure 2.  Conceptual  model  of the U.S.  dairy market
a wholesale  level in this study  facilitates the
incorporation  of government  intervention  in
the wholesale  manufactured  market.  A  sche-
matic view of the various components  of the
dairy sector is presented in figure  2.
Government  intervention  occurs  in the
wholesale  manufactured  market  for  cheese,
butter, and nonfat dry milk. Figure 2 illustrates
the occurrence  of a government  support  re-
gime, where the market equilibrium wholesale
manufactured  price  is below  the government
support  price  (Pg).  In  this  case,  Qdm  is  de-
manded in the commercial  market,  which  is
less than what is supplied (Qw m), and the gov-
ernment purchases  the excess  supply (Qg).  In
the case of the market equilibrium regime (not
shown),  the market equilibrium price is at or
above  Pg, wholesale  manufactured  supply
equals  demand, and Qg equals zero.
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specification for supply, demand, and the equi-
librium condition can be written  as:'
(la)  In Qrm = a  mln  prm  + frmln pwm
+  7rmln Zrm  +  t  ,rm
(lb)  In  Qrm = /3mln prm  +  _yrmln Zrm
+  irz,  and
(lc) In  Qm = In  Qrm  In  Qrm, In  QS  d  -
where Qr m and Qd  are the retail manufactured
quantity supplied and demanded, Prm and pwm
are the equilibrium retail manufactured  price
and  wholesale  manufactured  price,  Zsr  and
Zrm  are vectors of exogenous  supply and  de-
mand  shifters pertaining  to the retail  manu-
factured  market,  Qrm denotes  the equilibrium
retail manufactured quantity, and In is the nat-
ural logarithm.  The as, Os,  and  ys are the co-
efficients, and ,t  and Ad are error terms.
The  retail fluid  supply, demand,  and  equi-
librium condition can be written following the
form of the retail manufactured market as fol-
lows:
(2a)  In Qrf = af  In prf +  f In pwf
+  7f ln Zf + Ar,
(2b)  In Qu = Ofln prf + yf ln Zf
+ uf,  and
(2c) In  Q  If  = In  Qf = In Qrf
where superscripts rfand wfrepresent the retail
and wholesale  fluid markets, respectively.
The  wholesale  manufactured  supply,  de-
mand,  and  equilibrium  condition  (without
government purchases)  are:
(3a)  In  Qwm  = awmn  pwm  + _wmln P"
+  Y WMn  Zwm  +  w m,
(3b)  In Qm = In  Qrm,  and
(3c)  In Qsm = ln(Qdm  +  QSP + AINV),
where pIi is the Class II price, QSP is the quan-
tity  of milk sold  to the  government  by spe-
cialized plants, AINVis change in commercial
inventories of manufactured products, and all
' In the model that follows, we present a log-linear specification
because the empirical counterpart uses this specification. If a linear
model is desired,  simply  replace the  logarithm  measurement  by
its level for all variables.
other variables  are similarly defined with su-
perscript  wm denoting variables pertaining to
the wholesale manufactured market. Equation
(3b) specifies that the wholesale manufactured
demand  should  equal  the  equilibrium  retail
manufactured quantity as all the quantity vari-
ables are expressed on a milk-equivalent basis.
Finally, the variables QSP and AzINVare treat-
ed  as  exogenous  in  this  study  because  they
comprise a very small and rather constant por-
tion of manufactured quantity.2
The  wholesale  fluid  supply,  demand,  and
equilibrium condition can be written following
the form of the wholesale  manufactured mar-
ket as follows:
(4a)  In Qwf = af  Iln pwf +  Iwfln(P"i  + d)
+  yfln Zf + gf,
(4b)
(4c)
In Q"f = In  QrS,  and
In Qf = In QQf,
where d is the exogenous  Class I  differential.
All other variables  are defined as above with
superscript wf denoting that the variables per-
tain to the wholesale  fluid subsector.
The  wholesale  manufactured  price  appear-
ing in (la) and (3a) is constrained by the dairy
price support program. That is, since the gov-
ernment  sets  a  purchase  price  for  storable
manufactured dairy products and is willing to
buy surplus quantities  of the products at that
price, the following constraint holds:
(5) In Pwm  In Pg,
where Pg is the aggregate government purchase
price  for  the  manufactured  products  at  the
wholesale  level.
When the government support regime holds,
pwm  simply  equals  Pg  which  is  exogenous.
However,  the  quantity  of  government  pur-
chases emerges  as an additional  endogenous
variable  balancing  the  number  of equations
with the number of unknowns.  Accordingly,
the  equilibrium  condition  of  (3c)  for  the
wholesale  manufactured market becomes:
(3c')  In Qw m = ln(Qd'"  + QSP + AINV  +  Qg),
where  Qg is government purchases  measured
on a milk-equivalent basis.
2 While small does not by itself guarantee exogeneity (Binkley),
the first differences of these variables appear to be stationary with
a strong seasonal pattern.  Hence,  they are treated  as being  exog-
enous.
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Given the retail and the wholesale equations
in (1)-(5),  the dairy model  can be completed
by introducing the farm market.  To simplify,
it is assumed that dairy farmers'  price expec-
tations are  based solely on lagged prices.  Ac-
cordingly,  the farm  supply equation  is speci-
fied as:
(6a)  In Qf =af  In  L(Pf) + -yln L(Z)  + Af
where Q is the farm milk supply, Pis  the farm
milk price, thefsuperscript represents the farm
market, and L is the lag operator with L(X)  -
X_,.  Since  milk used  for fluid  and manufac-
tured purposes commands different prices, the
farm milk price is related to the average of the
Class  I  and  Class  II  prices  via the  following
equation:
(6b)  p  - (p"  + d)*Qwf +  II* Qwm
(6b)  Pf =
v ;
(Qf - FUSE)
where FUSE is on-farm use of milk, which is
assumed  to be exogenous.  Finally,  the farm-
level equilibrium condition is:
(6c)  In  Qf{  = ln(Qwf + Qwm  + FUSE).
To  summarize,  because  of the naive  farm
price  expectation  assumption,  the farm  milk
supply is predetermined at each point in time.3
Hence,  the above dairy model is recursive  in
nature consisting of a retail-wholesale  subsys-
tem  [equations  (1)-(5)]  and  a  farm  market
[equations  (6a-c)].  The focus  of this  study  is
to  examine  the  appropriate  estimation  pro-
cedure for the retail-wholesale  subsystem, giv-
en the recursive structure of the dairy model. 4
The  retail-wholesale  subsystem  encompasses
two possible regimes. In the case of the market
3Previous  studies in farm  milk  supply have  found that using
lagged  prices  as proxies  for  price  expectations  fits the data  well
(e.g., Chavas and Klemme; Kaiser, Streeter,  and Liu; and Liu and
Forker).  On  the other  hand,  LaFrance  and  de Gorter  employed
the current price of milk in the supply equation and used instru-
mental variable methods to deal with simultaneous determination
of supply and demand. To  assess the appropriateness  of the  pre-
determined farm milk supply in our quarterly model, the Hausman
endogeneity test was conducted. The hypothesis that the farm milk
supply was not predetermined was rejected  at the 5%  significance
level. Specifically, if Qf is predetermined,  the reduced form for the
farm milk price in (6b)  can be estimated  as a function  of all ex-
ogenous variables in the system, including  QA.  On the other hand,
if Qf is not predetermined, it has to be replaced by an appropriate
instrument [say, L(Q2)] in the above regression.  If the assumption
that Qf is predetermined  is correct,  then the difference in the co-
efficients from the two reduced-form estimations  should be close
to zero.
4 The farm  market equation  was estimated  in Liu et al.  (1990)
and the whole dairy model was used to conduct policy simulations
involving various  generic dairy advertising scenarios.
equilibrium regime, the endogenous  variables
are:  retail manufactured  demand and  supply
and wholesale  manufactured  demand  (Q m =
Qrm  =  Qdm), wholesale  manufactured  supply
(Qwm),  retail and  wholesale  fluid  supply and
demand (Qf = Qu = Qwf  = Qf), retail manu-
factured  price  (Prm),  wholesale  manufactured
price  (Pwm),  retail  fluid  price  (PR),  wholesale
fluid  price  (Pwe),  and Class II price  (PI). The
exogenous  variables, denoted by Z, are:
Z  = (Zr , Zr m ,  Zrf Z  ,  Zs,  Zwf Q,  d,
FUSE, QSP, AINV).
In the case of the government support regime,
Qg replaces  Pwm as an endogenous  variable in
this list, and the exogenous variables, denoted
by Z,,  are
Z,  = (Z, Pg).
The Switching  System Estimation Procedure
Taking  the unconditional  expectation  of the
structural equations (la), (lb),  (2a), (2b), (3a),
and (4a) yields:
(7a)  E[ln Qrm]  = armE [ln prm]
+ frmE[ln pwm]  +  7ymln Zr,
(7b)  E[ln Qrdn] = Pf3mE[ln prm]  + y mln Zm,
(7c)  E[ln Qf] = arE[ln  Prf]
+  rlE[ln Pwf]  +  y7f n  Z+  ,
(7d)  E[ln Qr] = /53E[ln prf] + %yln  Zf,
(7e)  E[ln Qwm]  = awmE[ln pwm]  + /3WmE[ln P"]
+ ywmln Z m,  and
(7f)  E[ln Qwf]  = asYfE[lnPwf] + j1wfE[ln(PI n + d)]
+ ?yfln  Zsf.
The  estimation  procedure  is  analogous  to
conventional  two-stage least squares,  consist-
ing of the following two steps. The first step is
to  estimate  the expected  prices  in the  right-
hand  side  of (7a)-(7f)  to  be  used  as  instru-
mental  variables  for prices  in  the  structural
equations estimation of the second step. Once
the instrumental variables  for price (hereafter
referred to as price instruments) are obtained,
the second step involves a straightforward ap-
plication of ordinary least squares to the struc-
tural equations  (la), (lb),  (2a), (2b),  (3a),  and
(4a) with the price instruments  replacing the
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observed  prices.  The  task is to obtain  a con-
sistent estimate of the reduced-form  price in-
struments.
Since the underlying  market  structures  are
different  between regimes,  there are  two  sets
of reduced-form  equations  with different  en-
dogenous  variables  (Pwm  or  Qg)  and different
sets of exogenous  variables  (Z or Z*).  In the
market equilibrium regime,  the reduced-form
equations  for the prices are:
(8a)  In pwm  = Irwmln  Z  + e w m >  In Pg  and
(8b')  In pi =  rni  In Z* + E*  i = rm, rf wf  II,
In  the  government  support  regime,  the  re-
duced-form  equations are:
(8a') In pwm = In pg  and
(8b')  In Pi = rn In Z* + e*  i = rm, rf wf, II,
where equations (8b) and (8b') pertain to retail
manufactured  price, retail  fluid price,  whole-
sale  fluid  price,  and  Class  II  price.  It is  im-
portant to note that the structural error terms,
AUs,  enter  the  log-linear  price  reduced-form
equations  in an additive fashion.  Hence,  the
price  reduced-form  error  terms  will  be  nor-
mally distributed if the structural error terms
are normally distributed. Since normality of es
is important to the procedure that follows,  we
demonstrate the connection using a simple two-
market model in the appendix.
Define the probability that the government
support  solution  occurs as · and  the proba-
bility that the market equilibrium solution oc-
curs as  1 - (.  That is,
PROB{ln  pwm  C In Pg}  and
1 - - PROB{ln pwm  > In Pg}.
Consider first the reduced-form equation for
the wholesale  manufactured  price in (8a) and
(8a'). Since  this price  is constrained to not be
less than the government  purchase  price,  the
use of ordinary least squares  to estimate (8a)
results in selectivity bias.  Combining the two
reduced-form  equations  in (8a)  and  (8a')  for
the two solution regimes weighted by their re-
spective  probabilities  and  taking  the  uncon-
ditional expectation of the resulting expression
yields:
(9)  E[ln Pwm]  =  (1  - ))E[ln wm I  lnPwm  >  In Pg]
+ · In Pg.
Assuming  that  Ewm  is  normally  distributed,
E[ln pwm  In Pwm > In Pg]  can be expressed  as
(Maddala,  pp.  158-59):
(10)  E[ln Pwm lnPwm > In Pg]
=  rwmln Z + a{((c)/[l  - b(c)]},
where  4(c) and  ¢(c) are,  respectively,  the cu-
mulative  standard  normal  and  the  standard
normal density,  both evaluated  at c  which is
defined as (In Pg - Trwmln Z)/a,  and a
2 is Var[ewm].
The coefficients for T.wm and a, as well as for 4
and ,  in (10), can be estimated simultaneously
and consistently by applying a maximum like-
lihood Tobit procedure  on (8a).  The last term
in  (10)  is  the  Heckman  correction  term  for
selectivity  bias  (Heckman).  Then,  by  substi-
tuting (10)  into  (9),  the price  instrument  for
the wholesale  manufactured price is:
(11)  E[ln Pwm]  =  (1 - )Trwmln  Z +  fln Pg
+  oa.
Now consider  the  reduced-form  equations
for the unconstrained prices  (i.e., retain man-
ufactured  price,  retail  fluid  price,  wholesale
fluid price, and Class II price) in (8b) and (8b').
Combining  the  two  reduced-form  equations
for the two solution regimes weighted by their
respective probabilities and taking the uncon-
ditional expectation of  the resulting expression
yields:
(12)  E[ln P] -(1  - )({r'lnZ
+ E[ei IlnPwm > ln Pg]}
+ · {irrln Z,
+ E[E i  nPwm  < InP  g]}.
Assuming the joint density of Emw  and  ei is bi-
variate  normal  and  making  use  of (8a),  the
following holds: 5
(13)
E[€i I In p"m > In Pg] = E[ei E wm > In Pg - Twmln Z]
= ((a/a){¢(C)/[  - (C)]},
where a' is COV[Ewmi].
Similarly, assuming  the joint density of Ewm
and e*  is bivariate normal and making  use of
(8a),  the following holds:
5 Assuming that the joint density ofx and y is bivariate normal
with zero  means, Johnson and Kotz show that
E[x  I y > z]  =  {COV[x,  y]/SD[y]}-{p(4)/(l  - ¢(0))},  and
E[x  I y <  z]  =  -{COV[x,  y]/SD[y]}{/(4)/A(4)},
where COV and  SD  are the  covariance  and  standard  deviation
operators and 4 is defined as z/SD[y].
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(14)
E[Ei  | In Pwm < In Pg] = E[e.  ewm <  In  g - _rwmln  Z]
=  - ('i./)){0(c)/A(c)},
where  art  is COV[ewmEl].  The price  instrument
for the unconstrained  prices may be obtained
by substituting (13) and (14) into (12) to give:
(15)
E[ln P] =  7ri[(1 - )ln Z]  +  7ri  [  In Zj]
+  (a'  - T')[0/a].
With estimates of ~, ¢, and (o from the Tobit
estimation  in (10),  the parameters  7ri,  -rx, and
(aI - ai)  in (15) can be estimated by ordinary
least squares with the observed values of In P
replacing E[ln P']. The last term in (15)  resem-
bles the Heckman correction  term in (10).
To  summarize,  rather  than regressing  each
endogenous  variable  on  all  exogenous  vari-
ables to  obtain  the  price  instrument,  the  re-
duced-form  equation  for the  wholesale  man-
ufactured price should be estimated by a Tobit
procedure  while those  for other  endogenous
prices should be  fitted to a weighted  average
of the  exogenous  variables  from  each  regime
with a Heckman-like correction term append-
ed.
prehensive  model is  obtained by augmenting
the government purchase price (In Pg) into the
exogenous  vector Z in the first term of (15):
(17)  E[ln P] = 7ra[(1 - b)ln Z.] +  7r*[Q  In Z.]
+  (i  - -*)[0/4],
where the augmented parameter vector -rx  con-
tains  iri and  an  additional  parameter  (i)  for
the government purchase  price.
The bias-corrected model in (15) can be ob-
tained by imposing the following single restric-
tion on the comprehensive  model  (17):
(18) {i= 0.
An F-test on (18) can be used to determine the
appropriateness  of the bias-corrected  model.
Similarly, an F-test on the following set of re-
strictions can be used to determine the appro-
priateness of the conventional model  in (16):
a  -_  a  =  0.
The Estimation Results
7r  - 7r  =  O  and (19)
Tests Against the Conventional  Model
To  investigate  whether  the  above  bias-cor-
rected procedure  matters empirically,  the fol-
lowing tests can be applied to the reduced-form
equations. With respect to the wholesale man-
ufactured price reduced-form equation in (10),
the second term on the right-hand side is the
Heckman correction term for selectivity bias.
Hence, a t-test for the estimate of  a can be used
to determine the existence of the bias if ordi-
nary least squares is used instead of the Tobit
procedure.
With  respect to the remaining  four uncon-
strained price reduced-form equations in (15),
a procedure based on the Atkinson nonnested
models  test is  used to  compare  models  (At-
kinson; Judge et al., p. 438).  Specifically,  there
are two nonnested models that need to be com-
pared, the bias-corrected model represented by
(15)  and  the  conventional  two-stage  least
squares  reduced-form  model which is:
(16)  E[ln P] = 7rl1n Z..
Following Atkinson,  a comprehensive  model
composed of both (15) and (16) is constructed
to test the  two competing  models.  The com-
Based on the conceptual model,  there are six
structural equations that need to be estimated:
retail  fluid  demand,  retail  manufactured  de-
mand, retail fluid supply, wholesale fluid sup-
ply, retail manufactured supply, and wholesale
manufactured supply. These equations are es-
timated  simultaneously  by  the  switching  re-
gime  estimation  procedure  discussed  previ-
ously using quarterly data from  1975 through
1987.6
6 The data used to estimate the structural equations come from
a variety of sources.  Selected years of Federal  Milk Order Market
Statistics [U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)  1970-88a] were
used for  the  Class  II  price,  Class  I  differential,  and  retail  and
wholesale fluid demand and supply.  Selected issues of Dairy Sit-
uation and Outlook (USDA  1970-88b) were  used for milk pro-
duction, net government price support program purchases,  com-
mercial inventories, and on-farm use of milk. This source also was
used to construct the retail manufactured  price index, which is a
weighted average of retail cheese, butter,  and ice cream price in-
dices. It also was used to construct the aggregate government pur-
chase price and wholesale manufactured market price. The Hand-
book of  Basic Economic Statistics (Bureau of Economic Statistics)
was used for the average hourly wage in manufacturing and civilian
population. U.S. Department of Labor (USDL), Bureau  of Labor
Statistics' publications Consumer Price Index (USDL 1970-88a),
Producer Price Index  (USDL  1970-88c),  and  Employment and
Earnings  (USDL 1970-88b) were used to obtain data on all retail
and wholesale prices and on the unemployment rate and disposable
income.  Finally, Leading National  Advertisers (Leading National
Advertisers,  Inc.)  was  used  for generic  advertising expenditures
for fluid and manufactured  products. A  detailed description and
listing of the data is presented in Liu et al. (1989).
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Table 1.  Estimated Structural Equations (The Bias-Corrected  Model)
ln(Qf/POP) =  -2.236  - .282  ln(Pr/INC) +  .154  ln(PBEV/INC) + .0025  In DGFA
(-14.88)  (-2.34)  (2.31)  (2.01)
+  .004  In  DGFA_,  + .0045  In DGFA 2  +  .004  In DGFA_3  + .0025 In DGFA_4
(2.01)  (2.01)  (2.01)  (2.01)
- .179  in TIME  - .028  SINi  +  .083  COS1 +.517,4_,
(-6.79)  (-3.60)  (10.70)  (3.24)
Adj. R
2 = .88  Durbin-Watson  =  1.84
ln(Qrm/POP) =  -2.467  - .928  In(Prm/INC)  +  .645  ln(PMEA/INC) + .0009 In DGMA
(-10.42)  (-2.68)  (2.29)  (1.64)
+  .0014 In DGMA_, + .0016  In DGMA_2 + .0014 In DGMA_3 + .0009  In DGMA_4
(1.64)  (1.64)  (1.64)  (1.64)
- 1.436  lnDPAFH +  .071  In  TIME  - .050  SIN1 - .085  COSi
(-2.09)  (2.64)  (-4.92)  (-8.29)
Adj. R
2 = .85  Durbin-Watson  =  2.07
In Qf = 2.809  +  .940  ln(Pf/Pwf)  - .111  ln(PFE/Pwf) - .015  UNEMP
(6.00)  (1.82)  (-3.68)  (-3.95)
+  .237  in Qf,-  .227  In Qrf  - .001  TIME  - .052  SIN1  +  .094  COS1
(1.76)  (-1.98)  (-1.90)  (-3.90)  (8.14)
Adj. R2=  .90  Durbin-h =  1.60
In Qm =  -1.507  +  .683  ln(Pm/Pw-)  - .334  ln(MWAGE/P wm)  - .042  COS1
(-1.69)  (2.37)  (-1.51)  (-2.78)
+  .163  In  Qrm  +  .581  In  Qr4
(2.21)  (6.55)
Adj. R
2 =  .93  Durbin-h =  1.36
In Qwf= 2.184  +  .381  ln(Pwf/(PII + d))  - .093  ln(PFE/(P" + d))  - .016  UNEMP
(4.03)  (2.66)  (-2.85)  (-3.98)
+  .240  In Qf, - .223  In  Qwf4  - .003  TIME-  .050  SIN1
(1.79)  (-1.96)  (-3.74)  (-3.74)
+  .094 COS1
(8.18)
Adj. R2 = .90  Durbin-h =  1.13
In Q
m =  .528  +  .870  In(Pwm/P)  - .544  ln(MWAGE/P")  - .122  POLICY
(2.70)  (1.50)  (-2.86)  (-4.37)
+  .301  In Qwm +  .351  In  Qwm  +  .00017 TIME2 +  .077 SIN1
(3.40)  (4.15)  (4.29)  (4.08)
- .125  COS1  +  .751  , w m
(-6.42)  (4.05)
Adj. R
2 = .96  Durbin-h =  .25
The  retail fluid  and manufactured demand
equations  are estimated on a per capita basis,
while the retail and wholesale supply equations
are estimated on a total quantity basis because
population  is not a supply determinant.  Both
demand equations  are expressed as functions
of their own price, per capita income,  price of
substitutes, advertising, a time trend, harmon-
ic  seasonal  variables,  and other  shifters.  The
supply equations are expressed as functions of
their own  price,  input prices,  lagged  supply,
harmonic  seasonal variables,  and other shift-
ers.  The estimation  results  are in table  1. All
the  estimated  coefficients  have  correct  signs
and are significant at conventional confidence
levels (as indicated  by the t-values in paren-
theses). The adjusted R-squared, Durbin-Wat-
son  statistics, and Durbin-h statistics  suggest
good fit of the data. A more specific explana-
tion of the equations follows.
Per capita retail fluid demand (Qc/POP) is
estimated as a function of the ratio of the retail
fluid milk price index (P) to per capita income
(INC), the ratio of the retail nonalcoholic bev-
erage price index (PBE  V) to per capita income,
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(DGFA), a time trend (TIME),  and two har-
monic seasonal  variables (SINl and COS1).7
The  specification  of the two  price-to-income
ratios is consistent with the zero homogeneity
assumption for prices and income (Phlips, pp.
37-38).  The beverage  price  index  is  a proxy
for the price of fluid product  substitutes. The
current  and  lagged  advertising  variables  ac-
count  for  the  impact  of advertising  on  de-
mand.8 The  time trend (first quarter of 1975
equals  one)  captures  the effect  of changes  in
consumer preferences  over time,  specifically,
the increasing concern about the link between
heart disease and fluid milk consumption.  The
two harmonic  seasonal variables  capture sea-
sonality in demand.  Based  on the estimated
autocorrelation  function and partial autocor-
relation function of the residuals, a first-order
moving-average error structure is imposed. All
the coefficients  remain  stable  after  imposing
the moving-average  term.
Per  capita  retail  manufactured  demand
(Qrm/POP) is  estimated  as  a  function  of the
ratio of the retail  manufactured  price  index
(Pm)  to per capita income, the ratio of  the retail
meat  price  index  (PMEA)  to  per  capita  in-
come, deflated generic manufactured  advertis-
ing expenditures  (DGMA), the deflated  retail
price index for food away from home (DPAFH),
a time trend, and the two harmonic  seasonal
variables.  The meat price index is a proxy for
the price of manufactured product substitutes.
The away-from-home  price  index is included
because  a large portion of cheese is consumed
away from home. The trend variable measures
the increase in consumer preferences for cheese
and yogurt.  Unlike fluid products,  consumers
do not perceive  manufactured  products  such
as cheese as high-fat products even though they
contain as  much fat as whole  milk (Cook et
al.,  p. 9).
Retail  fluid  supply  (Qr)  is  estimated  as  a
function of the  ratio of the retail  fluid  price
index to the wholesale  fluid price  index (Pw),
7 All deflated price variables are defined as the nominal measure
divided by the Consumer Price Index for all items (1967  =  100).
The variables COS1 and SIN1 represent the first wave of  the cosine
and sine,  respectively (Doran and  Quilkey).  The variable POP  is
the population of the United  States.
8 The impact of  current and lagged fluid advertising expenditures
on demand is  specified  as a second-order  polynomial distributed
lag with both end point restrictions imposed. The appropriateness
of the  end  point restrictions  was  tested  and  not  rejected.  This
specification is consistent with Ward and Dixon. The same  spec-
ification is used for the manufactured  advertising  expenditures in
the retail  manufactured demand equation.
the  ratio of the fuels  and  energy  price  index
(PFE)  to the wholesale fluid price index, lagged
supply,  the unemployment  rate  (UNEMP), a
time trend,  and  the harmonic  seasonal  vari-
ables. The specification  of the retail-to-whole-
sale  price  ratio  and  the  energy  price  to  the
wholesale price ratio is consistent with the zero
homogeneity  assumption  for  prices.  The
wholesale fluid and energy prices represent two
of the most important costs in fluid retailing.
The  two  lagged  dependent  variables  are  in-
cluded to capture  short- and longer-term pro-
duction capacity constraints. 9The unemploy-
ment rate  is used  as a proxy  for the state  of
the economy.  The  time  trend  is  included to
capture other determinants  of supply such  as
labor costs in the retail fluid sector, which are
unavailable.
Retail  manufactured  supply  (Qr m)  is  esti-
mated as a function of the ratio of the retail
manufactured  price  index  to  the  wholesale
manufactured  price  index  (Pwm),  the ratio of
the average hourly wage rate in the manufac-
tured sector (MWAGE) to the wholesale man-
ufactured price index, lagged supply, and a har-
monic  seasonal  variable.  The  wholesale
manufactured  price  accounts  for  the  largest
portion  of variable  costs,  and  the  manufac-
tured wage  rate measures  labor costs in man-
ufactured  retailing.  The energy  price and un-
employment  rate  were included  in the initial
estimation  of this  equation,  but were  subse-
quently omitted due to their coefficients being
of the wrong sign. Also, the trend variable and
SIN1  were omitted due to insignificant  coef-
ficients. The exclusion of TIME and SIN1 did
not change  the results  of the  estimation  sig-
nificantly.
Wholesale fluid supply (Qw t ) is estimated as
a function  of the ratio of the wholesale  fluid
price  index  to the Class I price  for raw milk
(pi = pn + d), the ratio of the fuels and energy
price index to the Class I price, lagged supply,
the unemployment rate, a time trend, and the
harmonic seasonal variables. The Class I price
is included because it represents the most im-
portant cost in fluid wholesaling.
Wholesale manufactured supply (Qw m) is es-
timated as a function of the ratio of the whole-
sale manufacturing  price index to the Class II
9  The eigenvalues for this dynamic system have real parts all less
than one in absolute value indicating  the equation  is stable.  The
stability condition also is satisfied for other dynamic supply equa-
tions presented  here.
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Table  2.  F-Tests  for the Price Reduced-Form  Equations
Bias-Corrected  Model  Conventional  Model
Equation  F(1,6)  P-Valuea  F(22,6)  P-Value
Retail Fluid Price (PI)  .22  .66  1.54  .31
Retail Manufactured  Price  (prm)  .61  .47  4.21  .04
(Rejected)
Wholesale Fluid Price (Pwl  3.09  .13  4.87  .03
(Rejected)
Wholesale Manufactured  Price (P
wm)  (Rejected)b
Class  II Price (P")  .83  .40  5.52  .02
(Rejected)
a At (1 - a)% confidence level,  one rejects  the model if the P-value is  less than a.
b Based on the t-ratio  on the Heckman-like  correction  term in equation (9).
price (P"), the ratio of the manufactured  wage
to the Class  II price,  lagged  supply,  a policy
dummy variable (POLICY), a time trend, and
the harmonic seasonal variables. The Class II
price is included because it represents the most
important  variable  cost  in  manufactured
wholesaling. The policy dummy variable (equal
to one for the first quarter of 1984 through the
second quarter of 1985 and the second quarter
of 1986 through the third quarter of 1987) ac-
counts for the significant reductions in raw milk
supply due to the implementation of the Milk
Diversion  Program  and  the  Dairy  Termina-
tion Program,  which had large impacts on the
wholesale  manufactured market. A first-order
moving-average  error structure  is imposed  to
correct  for serial  correlation  in the residuals.
All the coefficients remain stable after impos-
ing the moving-average  term.
Tests for Selectivity Bias in the
Conventional  Model
As previously indicated, a significant t-statistic
for the coefficient (a) on the Heckman correc-
tion term in (10)  signifies  the existence of se-
lectivity  bias  in the wholesale  manufactured
price reduced-form  equation  if ordinary  least
squares  (instead  of Tobit) is used.  The t-sta-
tistic for the estimated a is 6.4 using a maxi-
mum likelihood Tobit estimation procedure. 10
This  supports  the statistical  relevancy  of the
Tobit procedure  for the constrained wholesale
manufactured price  reduced-form  equation.
The  tests  for  the remaining  four  reduced-
form equations of  the unconstrained prices (re-
10The t-ratio  for the  estimate  of a  using a Heckman  two-step
estimation procedure (Maddala, pp.  158-59)  is  5.24.
tail  fluid  price,  retail  manufactured  price,
wholesale  fluid  price,  and  Class II  price)  are
based on the Atkinson procedure discussed in
(15) to (19).  The P-values  for the F-statistics
are presented in table 2. At the 95% confidence
level,  the bias-corrected model cannot be  re-
jected for all four equations. On the other hand,
the conventional  model is  rejected  for all  of
the price reduced  forms except the retail fluid
price. The result that the conventional model
cannot be rejected  for the retail fluid price  is
not that surprising  because this market prob-
ably has the weakest linkage to the supported
wholesale manufactured  market.
The above tests provide statistical evidence
that selectivity  bias  is  not simply  a problem
for the price directly influenced by government
intervention.  It  also  affects  other  price  re-
duced-form  equations in the system.
Empirical Implications  for Policy  Analysis
While  we have  shown  that the conventional
model suffers from selectivity bias, it is useful
to examine  the differences  in the magnitudes
of estimated structural parameters between the
two  models.  It is  also  useful  to  investigate
whether the two models generate different pol-
icy conclusions. To provide the basis for these
comparisons,  the conventional  model is esti-
mated using two-stage least squares assuming
the government purchase price is always bind-
ing.  The  estimation  results  are  presented  in
table 3.
The estimated structural equations are sim-
ilar to those of the bias-corrected  model with
respect  to  goodness  of fit,  t-values,  Durbin-
Watson and Durbin-h statistics. The major dif-
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Table 3.  Estimated Structural Equations (The Conventional  Model)
ln(Qf/POP) =  -2.253  - .267  ln(Prf/INC) +  .149  ln(PBEV/INC) + .0025 In DGFA
(-14.61)  (-2.13)  (2.17)  (1.96)
+  .004  In DGFA_, + .0045 In DGFA_2 +  .004  In DGFA_3 + .0025  In DGFA_4
(1.96)  (1.96)  (1.96)  (1.96)
- .176  In TIME  - .028  SIN1  +  .082  COS1 +  .502  y_,
(-6.46)  (-3.54)  (10.51)  (3.15)
Adj. R
2 = .87  Durbin-Watson  =  1.85
ln(Qdm/POP) =  -2.601  - .655  In(Prm/INC)  +  .432  In(PMEA/INC) + .0008 In DGMA
(-10.97)  (-1.85)  (1.55)  (1.30)
+ .0013  In DGMA,  + .0014  In DGMA_2  + .0013  In DGMA_3  + .0008  In DGMA_4
(1.30)  (1.30)  (1.30)  (1.30)
- 1.061  lnDPAFH +  .082  In TIME - .050  SIN1 - .085  COS1
(-1.48)  (2.82)  (-4.71)  (-7.98)
Adj. R
2 =  .84  Durbin-Watson  = 2.08
In Qrf= 2.856 +  1.108  ln(Pf/Pwf)  - .111  In(PFE/Pwf)  - .016  UNEMP
(6.17)  (1.98)  (-3.74)  (-4.06)
+  .230  In Qrl  - .245  In Qr(  - .001  TIME  - .052  SIN1  +  .096 COS1
(1.73)  (-2.13)  (- 1.74)  (-3.94)  (8.23)
Adj. R
2 = .90  Durbin-h =  1.75
In  Qr  =  -2.197  +  .897  ln(pm/Pwm)  - .506  ln(MWAGE/P
wm)  - .045  COS1
(-2.09)  (2.64)  (-1.96)  (-2.95)
+  .167  In Qr"  +  .560  In  Qrm"
(2.30)  (6.20)
Adj. R
2 =  .93  Durbin-h =  1.36
In Qf =  1.950  +  .461  ln(Pwf/(P" + d)) - .085  ln(PFE/(P"  + d)) - .016  UNEMP
(3.30)  (2.72)  (-2.49)  (-4.08)
+  .221  In Qs, - .203  In  Qwf  - .003  TIME  - .047  SIN1 +  .093 COS1
(1.66)  (-1.83)  (-3.77)  (-3.44)  (8.33)
Adj. R
2 = .90  Durbin-h =  1.13
In Q
m =  .285  +  1.117 ln(Pwm/P"I)  - .431  In(MWAGE/P") - .113  POLICY
(1.41)  (1.19)  (-2.26)  (-3.83)
+  .422  In  Qsw  +  .335  In Qwe + .00014 TIME
2 +  .100 SIN1  - .123  COS1
(5.01)  (3.76)  (3.30)  (4.74)  (-6.14)
+  .617  sw_
(3.54)
Adj. R
2 = .96  Durbin-h  = .25
ference  between  the  two  models  lies in  the
magnitudes of the price coefficients. In general,
the conventional model has smaller own-price
coefficients in the demand equations and larger
price coefficients  in the supply equations.  For
example,  the own-price  coefficients  in the re-
tail manufactured  supply equations  are  .897
for the conventional  model  and  .683  for the
bias-corrected  model. On the other hand, the
own-price  coefficients  in  the retail  manufac-
tured demand equations are -. 655 for the con-
ventional model and  -. 928  for the bias-cor-
rected model.
To investigate whether the two models gen-
erate  different  policy  conclusions,  dynamic
impulse  analyses  are  conducted  on  the con-
ventional and the bias-corrected  models. Two
policy variables are of interest: the government
purchase price (Pg) and the Class I differential
(d). The  levels  of these  two  variables  are  of
interest because they have been the key policy
instruments  set by Congress  and the Admin-
istration in the 1985  and the 1990  farm bills.
It is assumed that the dairy sector is in a steady
state  in  which  all the  variables  are  set at  a
three-year average of 1985-87. The two mod-
els are shocked with a permanent  10% increase
in the government  purchase price, and the im-
pacts on the endogenous  variables  are  simu-
lated for 20 quarters. A similar analysis is con-
ducted  with  a  10%  shock  in  the  Class  I
differential.  The  models are  solved  using the
Gauss-Seidel method.
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Figure 3a.  Impact of  10% permanent shock
in the government purchase price on the Class
II price
verge  to a new  steady  state within  two years
regardless of which model is used. In addition,
the  pattern  of the convergence  from  the  two
models is similar for most variables. However,
the level of the time paths differs  significantly
for some variables, as illustrated in figures 3a-
3d. In these figures,  the preshock  steady state
(quarters -4 to -1)  and the adjustment paths,
resulting from the shock (at quarter 0), for the
Class II price and  government  purchases  are
presented. With a permanent  10% shock in the
government  purchase price, the Class II price
in the conventional and bias-corrected models
reaches  a  new  steady  state  of  $13.40  and
$15.12,  respectively,  from an old steady  state
of $11.33  (figure 3a).  With a permanent  10%
shock in the Class I differential,  government
purchases decrease from an old steady state of
2.54  billion  pounds  per  quarter  to  1.64  and
1.40 billion pounds,  respectively,  which  rep-
resents an annual difference  of about one bil-
lion  pounds  between  the  two  models  (figure
3b).
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Figure 3c.  Impact of  10%  permanent shock
in the government  purchase  price  on  govern-
ment quantity
not dramatic  for all variables.  For example,
with a permanent  10%  shock  in the govern-
ment purchase price, government  quantity in
the  conventional  and  bias-corrected  models
reaches  a new  steady  state of 2.24 and  2.29
billion pounds per quarter, respectively (figure
3c).  Also, with a permanent  10%  shock in the
Class I differential, the Class II price increases
from  an old steady state  of $11.33 to $11.51
and  $11.89  for the  two  models,  respectively
(figure  3d). It  should be noted that while the
absolute differences are small, the relative dif-
ferences may be large. For instance,  the latter
case indicates that a 10% increase in the Class
I differential  results  in a 2.5% increase  in the
Class II price when the conventional model is
used,  while this  shock  results  in double that
increase  (5%)  when the bias-corrected  model
is used.
These results apply to most of the other en-
dogenous variables as well indicating that eco-
nomic analysis of the dairy sector based on the
conventional model may yield policy prescrip-
tions that are substantially different from those
QG  (bill. Ibs.)
. an  ,
PII  ($/cwt.)
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Figure 3b.  Impact of 10%  permanent  shock
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Figure 3d.  Impact of 10% permanent  shock
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based on the bias-corrected model. A similar
conclusion is found when  shocking  other ex-
ogenous  variables (e.g.,  income and  advertis-
ing) and when different initial steady-state val-
ues (other than the 1985-87  averages) for the
variables  in the model are used in the simu-
lation.
Summary
This  article  presented  a  multiple-market
switching  simultaneous  system model  for the
dairy  sector. It was  argued that this model  is
necessary  for the dairy sector in order to deal
with selectivity  bias caused  by switching  be-
tween two regimes:  (a) a government  support
regime which exists when the price determined
by competitive supply and demand conditions
is below the government  stipulated price and
(b) a market equilibrium regime which occurs
otherwise.  The  estimation  procedure  for the
system  is  similar  to  conventional  two-stage
least squares in that an instrument is first ob-
tained  from  the  reduced-form  equation  and
then is substituted into the structural equation
estimation.  However,  special  procedures  are
needed for the reduced-form  estimation in or-
der to correct for selectivity bias.
In general,  both the bias-corrected  and the
conventional  two-stage  least  squares  models
fit the data reasonably  well.  However,  based
on the Heckman two-step and Atkinson non-
nested test results, the restrictions required for
the conventional  model are not supported by
the data. It was shown that selectivity bias is
not  only  apparent  in  the  component  of the
system directly affected  by government  inter-
vention but also exists in other markets in the
dairy sector. In addition,  the results from the
impulse analyses indicate that economic anal-
ysis of the dairy sector based  on the conven-
tional  model  may  yield  policy  prescriptions
that are substantially different from those based
on the bias-corrected model.
[Received May 1990; final revision
received April 1991.]
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Appendix
It is shown here that, under the log-linear  structural spec-
ification,  normality in the  structural  error terms  implies
normality  in  the  corresponding  log  price  reduced-form
error terms regardless  of whether the market is in a com-
petitive or government  support regime.
To simplify, consider a two-market model consisting of
only a retail manufactured market and a wholesale man-
ufactured market, with a predetermined quantity of  whole-
sale manufactured  supply at any given point in time. As
in the full model, the government  sets a purchase price at
the  wholesale  level  and  stands  ready  to  buy  the excess
supply at that price. The retail demand, supply, and equi-
librium condition are described in text equations (1  a), (1  b),
and (Ic).  The wholesale demand is described by text equa-
tion (3b). The wholesale equilibrium condition is (3c) when
the market  is competitive  and  (3c') when  the market is
government supported. The wholesale manufactured sup-
ply in (3a) is not needed for this illustration because the
supply is assumed  to be  predetermined.
In the case of the market equilibrium  regime, the retail
price can be solved using (lb), (lc), (3b), and (3c):
(A.1) In  prm  =  A-  -dl
m
T  ,
where A  =  {ln(Q
wm - QSP - AIVN)  - ymln  Z
m}/fP
m.
Given In  Prm in  (A.1),  we solve  for  the wholesale  price
using (la), (lc),  (3b), and (3c):
(A.2)  In pwm  =  B  + (armdm - ;mm)/(dmr),
where  B  - {(n
m - arm)ln(Q m  - QSP  - INV)  +
acrmymln Zdm  - atrmTmln  Zrm}/(ld-mlrm). Upon inspecting the
error components  of (A. 1) and  (A.2), it  is clear that  the
log price reduced-form  error terms will be normally dis-
tributed if the log-linear structural error terms are normal.
In the case of the government support regime, we set In
pwm =  In Pg. Then, from text equations (la), (Ib), and (Ic),
we solve for the retail price:
(A.3)  In P-r = C + (,<m - -dTm)/([m  - arm),
where  C  {rmln Z
r m - dmln  Zdm  + fmln  Pg}/(lm
arm). From the error component of (A.3), it  is clear that
normality of the log price reduced-form  error is  also pre-
served in the case of the government support regime. Thus,
we  have shown that under the log-linear  structural spec-
ification,  normality in the  structural error terms implies
normality  in  the  corresponding  log  price  reduced-form
error terms regardless  of which regime occurs.
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